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In the United States, juvenile offenders are often excluded from
the jurisdiction of juvenile court on the basis of age and crime
type alone. Data from national surveys and data from psycholegal research on support for adult sanction of juvenile offenders
are often at odds. The ways in which questions are asked and
the level of detail provided to respondents and research participants may influence expressed opinions. Respondents may also be
more likely to agree with harsh sanctions when they have fewer
offender- and case-specific details to consider. Here, we test the
hypothesis that attitudes supporting statutory exclusion laws measured in the absence of specific case-specific details may not be the
best indicator of agreement with such laws in practice. We found
that support for statutory exclusion was affected by exposure to
information about an offender’s unique situation and by exposure
to general scientific information about adolescent development.
These results suggest that despite apparent widespread agreement
with automatic exclusion statutes, laypersons consider factors other
than those allowed by the law when they are asked how to treat an
individual offender.
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Since its inception in 1899, the juvenile court system in the United States has
endured numerous political challenges and has never, in practice, operated
entirely according to the progressive principles on which it was founded
(Tanenhaus, 2000). The most recent of these political challenges began in the
mid to late 1980s and has resulted in a more punitive juvenile justice system
and in a shrinking of the jurisdiction of many juvenile courts, as more and
more adolescent offenders are transferred to adult court. From the mid-1920s
until the late 1980s, judicial waiver was the primary (although not the only)
mechanism by which a juvenile who committed a serious offense could be
transferred from the juvenile justice system to criminal court (Dawson, 2000).
Although the history of judicial transfer is a complicated one (see Tanenhaus,
2000 for a review), and jurisdictions vary considerably, in general it can
be said that judicial waiver evolved as a mechanism by which a minority
of refractory and serious juvenile offenders, whose needs were considered
beyond the capacity of the juvenile justice system, could be transferred to
adult criminal court. The decision to waive a juvenile to criminal court was
made by a judge, usually at the request of the state.
In response to the claim that transfer decisions could be capricious, the
U.S. Supreme Court held in Kent v. U.S. (1966) that judicial waiver should
provide for the evaluation of individual characteristics of an offender, such as
maturity, amenability to treatment, and blameworthiness, before a decision
is made to transfer a youth to criminal court. The Court suggested eight criteria that judges should consider in making a transfer decision. Of the eight
criteria, the first three deal with the type of crime committed; criteria 4 and
5 concern procedural issues unrelated to the offender (e.g., ease of prosecution); and criteria 6 through 8 refer to the sophistication and maturity of the
offender, his or her amenability treatment, and situational factors that may
have contributed to the juvenile’s criminal behavior. Specifically, criterion
6 suggests that judges consider the sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by his or her home, environmental situation, emotional
attitude, and pattern of living. Kent did not ignore issues of public safety,
but suggested a balanced assessment of needs, whereby the judge should
consider both the prospects for adequate public protection and whether the
offender had a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation within the juvenile
court system (criterion 8).
While almost all states still have some form of judicial waiver in place,
legislative changes over the 1980s and 1990s led to a reduction in the reliance
on traditional waiver and a move toward statutory exclusion—the automatic
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exclusion of some juveniles from juvenile court jurisdiction on the basis
of offense type, age, and sometimes prior record (see Dawson, 2000, for a
review; Griffin, Torbet, & Szymanski, 1998; Snyder & Sickmund, 1995; Torbet
et al., 1996). Automatic transfer statutes essentially bypass all but the first
three Kent criteria: A juvenile is automatically waived, without a hearing,
if he or she is of a certain age and is alleged to have committed a specific kind of offense. Thus, these laws obviate any consideration of offender
characteristics that pertain to his or her sophistication and maturity, environmental situation, or amenability to treatment, and do not weigh public safety
concerns with the possibility of rehabilitating the offender.
Automatic transfer statutes, along with other punitive and discretionary
changes not discussed here (e.g., prosecutorial direct file), have contributed
to a substantial increase in the number of juveniles who are processed and
tried as adults in the United States (Bishop & Frazier, 2000a; Loughran et al.,
2010). According to the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics
there were 6,759 juveniles housed in adult jails across the nation and an
additional 2,266 in state prisons as of June 30, 2005; 85% of these offenders were adjudicated in adult court. The ramifications of these changes are
far-reaching and include higher recidivism rates for juveniles detained in
adult facilities compared to those in juvenile detention centers (even after
controlling for offense type and offense history; e.g., Bishop, Frazier, LanzaKaduce, & Winner, 1996; Fagan, 1996; Winner, Lanza-Kaduce, Bishop, &
Frazier, 1997).
This legislative shift toward harsher treatment of juveniles occurred in
response to several egregious and highly publicized crimes committed by
young offenders (e.g., Willie Boskett in New York State; Butterfield, 1995)
and to the dramatic increase in juvenile offending that occurred during the
1980s, alongside a general rise in violent crime that has been attributed
to the crack cocaine epidemic (Blumstein, 1995). Legislators and politicians
relied on public sentiment that the juvenile courts were ineffective (e.g., Dao,
1996; Gray, 1997) as support for the “get-tough” juvenile crime legislation of
the 1980s and 1990s (Finkel, Hughes, Smith, & Hurabiell, 1994). Indeed, the
relatively high level of consensus among public opinion surveys accumulated
during this time period suggests that the public was strongly in favor of these
measures (e.g., Sprott, 1998).
However, as noted by others (e.g., Scott, Reppucci, Antonishak, &
deGennaro, 2006; Stalans & Henry, 1994), public support for statutory exclusion and other “get-tough” measures has been established primarily through
phone surveys using general questions about nonspecific juvenile offenders who committed nonspecific crimes. For example, Schwartz (1992) asked
respondents in a national phone survey to indicate how strongly they agreed
or disagreed with adult prosecution for a juvenile who was charged with
committing a serious violent crime (68% were in favor). Similarly, a question from a Gallup poll given in 2000 and again in 2003 reads as follows:
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“In your view, how should juveniles between the ages of 14 and 17 who
commit violent crimes be treated by the criminal justice system—should they
be treated the same as adults, or should they be given more lenient treatment in a juvenile court?” (67% and 59% of respondents in 2000 and 2003,
respectively, were in favor of adult sanction; Ray, 2003). While these kinds
of questions might have the potential to elicit the explicit attitudes of the
respondents, research has shown that the public tends to favor harsher dispositions when presented with general descriptions of crimes and offenders
than when presented with specific details about a case or individual characteristics of the offender (e.g., Roberts & Doob, 1990; Stalans & Diamond,
1990). The way in which general questions are asked also impacts response.
A recent Campaign for Youth Justice survey (CFYJ, Arya, 2011) found overwhelming support (76%) for traditional waiver relative to statutory exclusion.
Such results seem to suggest an extraordinary shift in attitudes from the 2003
Gallup poll indicating more than 60% of the nation in favor of adult sanction.
But, the questions on the CFYJ survey were very detailed and each item was
always presented as a choice between pairs of statements:
Which statement do you agree with more?
Instead of a rigid policy for determining when youth are tried in adult
courts,
judges should make the decision on a case-by-case basis after a hearing,
and
take into account the seriousness of the offense and circumstances of the
individual child. | OR
When a youth is charged with a serious offense, the decision to try a
youth in
adult court should not be discretionary. For some crimes, youth should
automatically be charged as adults and tried in adult courts with no
exceptions.

In contrast, in a study that was designed to test the impact of question
type, Steinberg and Piquero (2010) found that support for adult sanction
depended on age, prior record, and offense but that there was no difference
between agreement with statements that suggested adult sanction should be
discretionary (apply to some offenders) and agreement with statements that
adult sanction should be automatic (apply to all). However, the questions
used in their survey lacked specific detail and were not pitted against other
options:
“How much do you support trying [all/some] [first-time/repeat]
[14/17 year-old] offenders arrested for [theft/rape] in adult court?”
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When people are asked general questions about nonspecific crimes
committed by nonspecific offenders, they may rely on the most accessible specific example that can be brought to mind (Stalans, 1993; Stalans &
Henry, 1994). Given that most people do not have extensive experience with
juvenile offenders, Stalans (1993) has suggested that the “most-accessible
offender” is likely to resemble offenders whose crimes are most often
depicted in the media and, therefore, to be nonrepresentative of the average
juvenile facing exclusion from juvenile court (i.e., we rely on an “availability heuristic”; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Since the typical adolescent
offender rarely makes the evening news, high levels of agreement with
adult sanction may be a result of a false belief that most juvenile offenders
are super-predators. Recently, Salerno and colleagues (2010) demonstrated
this phenomenon with respect to support for the public registry of juvenile
sex offenders; support for juvenile registration was a result of participants’
spontaneous production of a “serious offender” prototype. Participants who
envisioned less severe prototypes (or had less severe prototypes activated)
were less likely to do so. However, Haegerich, Salerno, and Bottoms (2013)
found support for the existence of at least two prototypes with respect to
juvenile offenders (i.e., wayward youth and super-predator). In their sample, most participants did not appear to hold super-predator prototypes,
although participants who did (or who had this prototype activated) were
more inclined to find a juvenile defendant guilty and more likely to agree
with adult sanction for the offender.
Since statutory exclusion laws do not allow for mitigation based on an
offender’s amenability to treatment, maturity, or environmental situation,1
it seems logical to assume that anyone who expresses explicit support for
statutory exclusion must believe that the decision to try a juvenile as an adult
should be made solely on the basis of the type of crime committed and the
age of the offender. But, research on factors that influence support for adult
sanction suggest that the public has a rather complex view of which juveniles should be transferred. Although most studies have focused on age and
crime type (Garberg & Libkuman, 2009; Ghetti & Redlich, 2001; Steinberg
& Piquero, 2010), a few studies have examined factors that would be part
and parcel of a judicial review, but not likely to be codified by exclusion
statutes, such as abuse history and cognitive function (Najdowski, Bottoms,
& Vargas, 2009; Nunez, Dahl, Tang, & Jensen, 2007; Stalans & Henry, 1994).
Others have also examined extralegal factors such as gender, race, and apparent physical maturity (Nunez et al., 2007; Scott et al., 2006). There is also
a fairly robust body of literature that has shown that individual offender

1
Many states have procedural protections in place to mitigate the risk of decision errors; for example,
decertification, whereby a judge can transfer a juvenile back to juvenile court (Feld, 2000). However, it
appears these mechanisms are rarely used in practice (Feld, 2000; Brannen et al., 2006).
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characteristics, in addition to age and crime type, influence participants’ likelihood to find hypothetical juvenile defendants guilty, and their likelihood
to agree with punitive sanction (e.g., Crosby, Britner, Jodl, & Portwood,
1995; Haegerich et al., 2010) The results of these studies are at odds with
widespread support for exclusion on the basis of age and crime type alone.
Four studies have specifically attempted to examine support for automatic transfer laws by manipulating contextual information about the
offender’s situation while also controlling for crime type (Najdowski et al.,
2009; Nunez et al., 2007; Scott et al., 2006; Stalans & Henry, 1994). Two
of these studies (Nunez et al., 2007; Stalans & Henry, 1994) examined
the effect of abuse history (abused or nonabused) and offender’s relationship to the victim (parent/stranger) on preference for adult adjudication
for the offender. Stalans and Henry (1994) reported that abuse history of
the offender reduced the likelihood that participants would recommend
adult court for the offender. Nunez et al. (2007) found that abuse history
and younger age predicted preference for juvenile court jurisdiction, and
that these effects were qualified by interactions with gender (i.e., participants were least likely to recommend juvenile court for nonabused, older
males). Najdowski et al. (2009) examined the effects of intellectual capacity and abuse on mock jurors’ perceptions of female juvenile offenders and
found abuse to be a mitigating factor, but only for juvenile offenders who
committed self-defense murders of their abusers. With regard to intellectual functioning, mildly mentally retarded offenders were perceived as less
blameworthy, less deviant, and more influenced by their environments than
offenders with average intellectual functioning (in their first study); however
(in their second study) this held only for the offenders who committed drug
offenses and not for those who committed more serious crimes (Najdowski
et al., 2009). Finally, Scott et al. (2006), while not examining factors that
could be explicitly considered in judicial review, manipulated the extralegal factors of race and apparent maturity in the context of identical crime.
Results revealed that apparent maturity, but not race, influenced participant
agreement with adult sanction for the offender.
Taken together, these studies suggest that people have complex views
about which juveniles should be transferred and that contextual information,
other than age and crime type, is important when making these decisions;
however, the total number of studies is small, and the results in at least two
(Stalans & Henry, 1994; Nunez et. al., 2007) may have been confounded by
inadvertent crime-type manipulations. In the Stalans and Henry (1994) paper,
the abused adolescent killed a parent during an argument, whereas the
nonabused adolescent killed a stranger during a robbery. The Nunez et al.
(2007) paper attempted to correct for this confound by maintaining the parent as the victim across conditions, but it is possible that participants inferred
differences in motivation (i.e., self-defense) between a child killing an abusive parent versus a child killing a nonabusive parent. This seems particularly
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compelling in light of Nadjowski et al.’s (2009) finding that abuse was mitigating only in the context of self-defense crimes. Moreover, these studies
did not measure participants’ a priori views or attitudes toward juvenile
offender policy prior to exposing them to contextual or character manipulations. Such measurement would be useful in establishing whether explicit
agreement with harsh sanction for offending juveniles, in general, accurately
reflects approval of the outcomes of these laws in practice. Although not
achieving perfect ecological validity, it would certainly expand our understanding of public sentiment to measure general levels of support for harsh
sanction before measuring participants’ agreement with exclusion as applied
in specific cases.
In this study, we extend work from two earlier pilot studies (Zottoli &
Zapf, 2006; Zottoli, Daftary, Rodriguez, & Zapf, 2009) in which we found that
knowledge of offender characteristics other than age and crime type predict
agreement with exclusion above and beyond participants’ a priori support
for exclusion statutes. Specifically, we hypothesized that participants would
be less inclined to agree with statutory exclusion for a youth for whom
mitigating case information was available, compared to youth for whom
aggravating case information or no case information was presented.
Moreover, we wanted to explore whether we could affect explicit support for adult sanction by exposing participants to general information about
adolescent offenders. Presumably, support for or against any public policy
is a result of personal and vicarious experience, as well as exposure to
information (and misinformation) about the policy and its impact. A substantial body of research has examined the impact of information in the media
on attitudes toward criminal justice policy and has consistently shown that
attitudes toward various criminal justice policies (e.g., death penalty, gun
control) are influenced by the media (e.g., Altheide, 2002; Chiricos, Padgett,
& Gertz, 2000). Furthermore, existing research suggests that a more sophisticated understanding of policy outcomes and offender attributes is associated
with weaker support for empirically unsound policies (e.g., Stevenson, Smith,
Sekely, & Farnum, 2013).
Thus, we hypothesized that exposure to factual, scientific information
about adolescent development and juvenile justice policy might render participants more lenient than unexposed participants when asked about their
level of support for the adult sanction of an offender. To test this, we used an
unrelated studies design through which we exposed half of our participants
to scientific information about juvenile offenders before comparing preference for adult sanction between those who were and were not exposed
to the information. Given the suggestion of Stalans and colleagues (Stalans,
1993; Stalans & Diamond, 1990) that the apparent disconnect between dispositional decisions made with and without case-specific information may
be a result of reliance on the most available, but not necessarily most accurate, example that can be brought to mind (i.e., “most accessible exemplar”;
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hereafter, “mental model”), we further hypothesized that the effect of information exposure in our study would only be present when there was no
other offender-specific information, apart from age and crime type, to rely
on. That is, when there was enough case and offender detail available to
obviate a need to rely on preconceptions, participants would form a very
specific picture of the offender that would be moderated only minimally
by general knowledge about adolescent offenders. Finally, we hypothesized
that both the effect of being made aware of specific details about offender
characteristics and the effect of information exposure on support for adult
sanction would be explained by how these variables affected participants’
perceptions of the offender’s maturity (that is, how adult-like the offender
was perceived to be).

METHOD
Participants
Participants were 293 self-selected U.S. residents recruited from the community (New York City) via an online classified advertisement service. Two
participants were excluded because they were non-U.S. residents and 17 participants were excluded because their scores on one or more of the measures
were determined to be outliers based on their median absolute deviations
(Wilcox, 2005).2 The final sample consisted of 274 participants, of whom
the majority (79%) was female. Sixty-five percent of the sample identified as
White, 15% as Hispanic, and 15% as Black. Participants ranged in age from
18 to 71 years, with an average age of 32.7 years (SD = 11.8), and the sample
had an average of 15.3 years of education (SD = 1.8). Fifty-two percent of
the sample identified as liberal, 41% identified as moderate in their political
views, and 7% as conservative. Participants had the chance to enter their
email addresses into a drawing for a chance to win a $50 gift card at the end
of the study. Participants, who took part in what they were told were two
separate studies, had two opportunities to enter drawings. E-mails for the
drawings were kept in separate databases from study data and the drawings
for the two (ostensibly separate) studies were independent of each other.

2
Inspection of the data revealed that outlying data points were a result of inconsistent responding
or a biased pattern of responding (e.g., all responses were at the endpoint of the scale, regardless the
direction of the question). The decision to remove extreme outliers was made prior to data analysis,
according to preestablished criteria.
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Study Design
We employed a 3 (Offender Characteristics: Abstract, Mitigating, Aggravating)
× 2 (Information: Exposed, Unexposed) between-subjects design, with a priori Attitudes Toward Juvenile Transfer as a covariate, to test for the effects
of Information Exposure and Offender Characteristics on support for adult
sanction and perception of offender’s maturity. To minimize demand characteristics, we used an unrelated studies technique to expose half of our
participants to factual, scientific information about juvenile offenders. These
participants, and those who were not exposed to this information, were then
enrolled in an ostensibly different study on juvenile justice, during which
they were randomly assigned one of three vignettes about a felony-murder
committed by a 14-year-old offender. Participants were asked to give their
opinions on how adult-like the offender appeared and how likely they were
to agree with a law that excluded the offender from juvenile court without
judicial review. Age and crime type were identical across vignettes, which
differed according to sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern
of living (Kent criterion 6).

Materials
ATTITUDE MEASURES
Prior to being enrolled in our study, participants filled out three attitude
surveys online and were told they would be contacted, randomly, when
studies at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice became available.
The Juvenile Waiver Scale (Levett, Crocker, & Kovera, 2010) was used to
assess participants’ a priori attitudes toward adult sanction of juvenile offenders and their beliefs about the sophistication and dangerousness of juvenile
offenders. The scale consists of 16 items rated on a 6-point Likert-type scale
from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Item content is intended to tap
such things as belief about the capacity of juveniles to form intent and the
degree to which youthful offenders recidivate, as well as the belief that adult
sanctions deter crime. Higher scores on the scale indicate harsher attitudes
toward juvenile offenders. Although internal consistency of the scale in our
sample was satisfactory (alpha = .71), 3 items were negatively correlated
with the total score, whereas the remaining 13 item-total correlations were
positive and high (> .5). Removal of the three weak items increased scale
variance and internal consistency (alpha = .83), but did not change the pattern of results obtained in a significant way. Therefore, the scale used in our
analyses contained only 13 of the original 16 items.
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FAUX SCALES
Two additional scales were administered to lend veracity to the idea that participants would be participating in two or more unrelated studies. On these
scales, participants rated their level of agreement with a series of items
reflecting the reliability of eyewitness testimony and their attitudes toward
the death penalty. The items on the faux scales were written in a format
similar to the items on the Juvenile Waiver Scale. These data were not
tabulated.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Information Exposure (Hereafter Exposure). Videotaped depositions
were used to expose half of the participants to psycholegal information on
juvenile offenders and adolescent decision making, as well as data on the
effect of adult sanctions on adolescent offenders. These participants, selected
at random, were asked to participate in a study for which they would watch
experts testify in a deposition and then rate the quality and persuasiveness
of the expert’s testimony. To maintain the fiction that this study was not
about juvenile justice issues, two videotaped depositions were used (participants were told that they would watch two of three different videos that
would be randomly selected). In the first deposition, an expert provided testimony in a juvenile reverse-waiver hearing; in the second deposition, the
expert witness provided testimony on the reliability of eyewitness evidence
in a burglary trial. All participants watched videos on line. The expert witness in the videotaped deposition was played by a local amateur actor who
represented a psychologist testifying in a reverse-waiver hearing of a youth
who was removed from family to adult court. In the course of the testimony, the psychologist answered general questions posed by the retaining
attorney about (a) typical adolescent development and decision making, (b)
typical time-course patterns of adolescent offending, including base rates,
and (c) statistics on comparative outcomes of youth processed in adult versus family court. All data were sourced from peer-reviewed journal articles
in the disciplines of developmental, forensic and neurosychology, cognitive
neuroscience, and criminal justice.
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SITUATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
OFFENDER (HEREAFTER CHARACTERISTICS)

OF THE

JUVENILE

Participants were randomly assigned a crime vignette about a 14-year-old
male who committed a felony murder (charge consistent with New York
State criminal code). There were three vignettes (Abstract, Mitigating, and
Aggravating) that varied only insofar as the offender’s environment and situation. Following Stalans (1993), the Abstract vignette included no details
about the offender apart from his age, the crime he was charged with, and
his relationship to the victim.

Attitudes Toward Statutory Exclusion

433

Abstract Vignette: PK is a 14-year-old boy charged with the murder of
his 15-year-old classmate, AJ, who classmates say taunted PK for being
dumped by his girlfriend. At 3 PM, on April 7, PK robbed AJ at gunpoint
in a parking lot adjacent to the schoolyard. According to a witness, AJ
complied with PK’s demands and handed over the contents of his pockets
($12 and a Swiss Army pocket knife). While PK was putting the money
and knife in his backpack, someone yelled for the police. PK was startled
and the gun went off. AJ was shot just below his left shoulder and died
six hours later in the local hospital.

The Mitigating and Aggravating vignettes included these identical facts
presented in exactly the same format, but followed by a brief addendum describing the social histories, interpersonal functioning, and current
environmental situations of the juveniles. The Aggravating addendum was
designed to activate a serious-offender mental model and the Mitigating
addendum was designed to activate a wayward-youth mental model, but care
was taken to ensure that vignettes depicted realistic and complex pictures
of juvenile offenders. Factors selected for the vignettes included attributes
that have been previously described in the literature as reflecting waywardyouth and serious-offender stereotypes (e.g., Gluck, 1997) and that have
been shown to influence judicial waiver decisions (e.g.,Brannen et al., 2006).
We were not concerned with the effects of any specific factor that contributed
to overall valence of the vignette, but rather with creating vivid pictures of
a sympathetic and an unsympathetic case. Importantly, it was essential that
the included details would have no bearing on where the case would be
heard; in New York State, offenders in all vignettes would be charged as
adults automatically, by virtue of age and offense alone.
Mitigating Addendum: PK was described as quiet and nondisruptive
by his teacher. Fellow students described him as nice. PK has been in
and out of protective services since he was 3 years old because his
mother, who was 16 at the time of his birth, has had difficulty maintaining employment and was arrested twice for intent to sell controlled
substances and once for prostitution. PK was physically abused while in
foster care when he was between the ages of 5 and 7. PK was returned
to his mother’s custody in June of 2003 after his mother had successfully
completed rehab for alcohol addiction and obtained a steady job at a
local fast food restaurant. The two now live in a studio apartment in the
Bronx. PK is not in contact with his father, and has no other relatives in
the area. Although not a disruptive student, he has consistently struggled
in school and was diagnosed with a learning disability when he was in
the fourth grade. PK confessed to shooting AJ, and claims to have found
the gun inside a shoebox in his friend’s closet. He has been withdrawn
and uncommunicative since the shooting, unable to make eye contact.
On assessment by a forensic psychologist, PK was tearful and remorseful. He said that his girlfriend was the only person who loved him and
he didn’t understand why she left him. He said he didn’t mean to shoot
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AJ, but he got scared when he heard the scream and the gun went off.
He kept repeating that he did not know there were bullets in the gun.
He told the psychologist that he wishes he had never been born. The
report by the psychologist suggested that PK was in need of treatment
and that with proper help it was very unlikely that he would commit
similar crimes in the future.
Aggravating Addendum: PK has two prior delinquency findings and a
history of misconduct in school. Despite being an above-average student
who is considered “popular” by fellow students, he often broke school
rules and was suspended once for the use of threatening language with
a teacher. One student described him as popular, but “kind of a bully
toward the nerds.” Teachers describe him as disruptive in class and defiant towards authority. He lives with his mother and grandmother in a
small house in Chappaqua, NY. His parents never married, but he sees
his father one night a week, and every other weekend. There are no
reports of any family disruption. By all reports, his parents are loving and
generous people who get along amiably with each other and in the community. PK confessed to the shooting and claims to have stolen the gun
two weeks earlier from his friend’s brother’s truck, where he saw it stored
in a case. PK has not expressed remorse for his actions. On assessment
by a psychologist, PK said, “I should not have let my pride get the best
of me because now I am stuck in jail! I wanted to make him see how it
feels to have someone steal something from you. So I stole his money!”
A report by the forensic psychologist suggested that PK is not suffering
from any mental illness and there is no indication that he has any history
of abuse or trauma.

OUTCOME VARIABLES
Perception of the Offender (Hereafter Perception). After reading the
vignettes, participants responded to eight items rated on a six-point Likerttype scale (from 1, Much More Likely, to 6, Much Less Likely). The items
measured participants’ opinions as to how likely the individual in the vignette
was to understand the consequences of his actions, to change with treatment,
to commit future offenses, and to participate competently in his own defense,
compared to a similarly offending adult (4 questions) and a nonoffending
same-age juvenile (4 questions).
Compared to [nonoffending juveniles of the same age/adults who committed similar offenses], is PK more or less likely to: (a) be competent to
stand trial, (b) have understood the long-term consequences of what he
was doing, (c) respond to treatment, (d) commit another crime?

The aggregate of these items was used as a measure of the participant’s
perception of the offender as more or less adult-like. Higher scores indicated
that the offender was viewed as being more similar to a nonoffending juvenile than a similarly offending adult. Internal consistency of the scale was
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acceptable (alpha = .73) and all items but one were positively and robustly
correlated with the total score. Removal of the item that was weakly but positively correlated with total score did not substantially improve scale variance
or internal consistency, so this item was retained.
AGREEMENT

WITH

EXCLUSION (HEREAFTER AGREEMENT)

Participants rated, on a six-point Likert-type scale (from 1, Strongly Agree,
to 6, Strongly Disagree), how strongly they agreed or disagreed with a law
that automatically excluded the offender in the vignette from juvenile court
without a judicial evaluation.
In many states, including NYS, this offender would be excluded automatically from the juvenile court based solely on the offense he committed,
without an evaluation of individual factors such as maturity and amenability to treatment. If tried as an adult he faces adult sanctions and is less
likely to receive the rehabilitative benefit the juvenile justice system is
intended to provide. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the
law that automatically excludes this juvenile from the jurisdiction of the
juvenile justice system without an individual evaluation?
Higher scores indicated lower levels of agreement.

Procedure
The entire study was completed online, using SurveyMonkey. We eliminated
duplicate IP addresses and e-mail addresses, and reviewed responses for
identical demographic details and response patterns. By signing up online,
participants agreed to enroll in a subject pool at the John Jay College of
Criminal Justice whereby they would be eligible to participate in several
different studies taking place at the college. When they signed up, they
provided demographic information and filled out several attitude surveys,
which included the Juvenile Waiver Scale (Levett et al., 2010) and the faux
scales on the death penalty and eyewitness testimony.
Participants who completed the surveys were selected at random to
complete one or two studies. Of course, all participants were enrolled in
a single study, but in order to expose half of our participants to information that we thought would influence their support for or against exclusion,
we needed to ensure that they did not associate exposure to this information with the aims of our investigation. Thus, half of our participants were
contacted and asked to participate in a study evaluating the effectiveness
of expert testimony. Those who consented watched videotapes of experts
testifying in court and answered questions about the style, clarity, and persuasiveness of the experts, including four attention check items. Participants
were told that all facts in the testimony had been checked and that they only
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needed to be concerned with the communication style and effectiveness of
the expert. All subjects in this condition watched two videos, the first of
which was always the expert testifying in the juvenile case. Approximately
two to five days later, participants who completed the expert effectiveness
questionnaires and who correctly answered at least three of four attention
check questions were contacted again and asked if they were interested
in participating in another study at [the college]. At this time, these participants were told they were being enrolled in a study on juvenile justice
issues. The other half of our participants were not asked to participate
in the expert-evaluation study, but were contacted only about participating in the study on juvenile justice issues. The participants who watched
the videos (hereafter exposed participants) and those who did not (hereafter unexposed participants) were randomly assigned to one of the three
vignettes (Abstract, Mitigating, and Aggravating) that, as described above,
varied in environmental and situational factors other than age and crime
type. (Note that participants were randomly assigned to exposure conditions
at the time they entered the subject pool; subsequently, exposed participants
were randomly assigned to vignette condition at the time they completed
the exposure portion of the study.) After reading the vignette, participants
responded to the eight questions that were aggregated into a measure of the
participants’ Perception of the offender as more or less adult-like. The participants also rated their level of Agreement with a law that would automatically
exclude the juvenile in the vignette from the juvenile justice system.
All participants were subsequently debriefed. Exposed participants were
told that the videotaped information was presented to them under false pretenses in order to test whether their responses to the crime vignettes were
affected by the information they received through that presentation. These
participants were told they could request that their data be destroyed if they
felt uncomfortable by this manipulation. No participant objected.

RESULTS
Data Checks
Two hundred and ninety-three participants completed the study and correctly responded to attention checks. Two hundred and seventy-four were
included in the analyses. Sample sizes differed among experimental conditions as a result of random assignment (i.e., original groups were unequal
in size by chance) and different rates of attrition. We oversampled for the
Exposure conditions given our expectation of greater attrition for participants
taking part in two studies; nonetheless, we still retained fewer participants
across all three Exposure conditions relative to other conditions. Inspection
of our data revealed no identifiable systematic biases between participants
whom we lost and those whom we retained.
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Data were examined for violations of the assumptions underlying the
analytic methods employed (i.e., ANOVA/ANCOVA). Data points deemed
missing at random were estimated using linear regression. Outliers were
identified using the median absolute deviation method as described by
Wilcox (2005).

Demographic Variables
All six experimental groups were roughly equivalent in age, education,
gender, and race; therefore, we did not include any of these variables as
covariates in our models. In contrast, despite random assignment, the political affiliation of participants was not equivalent across groups and political
affiliation was significantly associated with the dependent variable, such that
self-identified liberal participants were less inclined to agree with exclusion
than were self-identified conservative participants. However, the effect of
political affiliation on Agreement with Exclusion was entirely accounted for
by scores on the Attitudes Toward Juvenile Transfer scale. Since our purpose was to test whether or not information exposure and characteristics
affected agreement with statutory exclusion, controlling for a priori attitudes
toward adult sanction, all analyses of the effects of the IVs were repeated
with Attitudes Toward Juvenile Transfer as a covariate, thus controlling for
political affiliation in our models.

A Priori Attitudes Toward Adult Adjudication for Juvenile Offenders
Despite the fact that the majority of our respondents described themselves
as liberal or left-leaning, scores on the Attitudes Toward Juvenile Transfer
scale were centered at about the midpoint of the scale’s range, X = 41.3,
showed substantial variability, ranging from 20 to 75 (SD = 8.8), and did not
deviate markedly from normal. Thus, our participants seem to have entered
the study with a range of opinions with respect to adult sanction.

Agreement With Exclusion of the Offender From Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction
To examine the effect of offender Characteristics and information Exposure
on participants’ Agreement with a law that automatically excludes the
offender from the juvenile justice system, a two-way ANOVA was run
with Agreement as the dependent variable and with Characteristics and
Exposure as independent variables. Results revealed a significant effect for
Characteristics, F(2,268) = 6.9, p < .001, ηp 2 = .05 and, as shown in
Table 1, planned a priori comparisons of the three conditions confirmed
our hypothesis that participants were less likely to agree with exclusion
of the offender in the Mitigating condition as compared with either the
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Agreement
Perception

4.7 (.2)
31.8 (.8)

Exposed
(n = 42)
3.8 (.2)
28.6 (.7)

Unexposed
(n = 52)

Abstract

4.2 (.2)
30.0 (.7)

Combined
(n = 94)
5.0 (.2)
34.2 (.8)

Exposed
(n = 46)
4.8 (.2)
33.8 (.7)

Unexposed
(n = 56)

Mitigating

4.9 (.1)
34.1 (.6)

Combined
(n = 102)

4.1 (.3)
28.5 (1.0)

Exposed
(n = 27)

4.6 (.2)
27.2 (.7)

Unexposed
(n = 51)

Aggravating

4.5 (.2)
27.6 (.6)

Combined
(n = 78)

TABLE 1 Means and Standard Errors for Agreement With Exclusion and Perception of the Offender as Adult-Like for Each Experimental
Condition
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Abstract or Aggravating conditions, which were not significantly different
from each other. In addition, although the effect of Exposure on Agreement
was not significant, as predicted, the Characteristics × Exposure interaction
was significant, F(2,268) = 5.8, p = .003, ηp 2 = .04. Post-hoc analysis of the
interaction (alpha set at .016) supported our hypotheses. Exposure had a significant effect on Agreement in the Abstract condition, t(92) = 3.2, p = .002,
such that participants in the Abstract condition who were exposed to scientific information about juvenile offenders were significantly less likely to
agree with exclusion than participants in the control condition. Exposure
was not significant in the Mitigating, p = .46, or Aggravating, p = .16,
conditions.
Since a primary hypothesis was that the effect of Characteristics and
Exposure would persist even after controlling for a priori attitudes to juvenile transfer, we ran an ANCOVA using Attitudes as a covariate. Expectedly,
individuals who scored higher on Attitudes (i.e., expressed harsher views of
juveniles who offend) were significantly more likely to agree with exclusion
(F(1, 267) = 22.6, p < .0001, ηp 2 = .08), and the effects reported above
remained significant.

Perception of the Offender as Adult-Like
Similar analyses were performed to examine the effect of Characteristics and
Exposure on participants’ Perception of the offender as more or less adultlike. Characteristics had a significant effect on Perception, F(2,268) = 29.5,
p < .0001, ηp 2 = .18, and, as shown in Table 1, planned a priori comparisons
of the three conditions again confirmed our hypothesis that participants were
less likely to perceive the offender in the Mitigating condition as adult-like
compared with either the Abstract or Aggravating conditions. In addition,
offenders in the Abstract vignette were perceived as less adult-like than
offenders in the Aggravating vignette. Participants who were exposed to
scientific data relevant to adolescents in the criminal justice system were also
less likely than unexposed participants to perceive the offender as adult-like,
F(1,268) = 6.1, p = .014, ηp 2 = .02. The interaction between Characteristics
and Exposure did not reach significance, F(2,268) = 1.8, p = .17, ηp 2 = .01.
Again, we next ran an ANCOVA with Attitudes entered as the covariate.
Attitudes was significant (F(1, 267) = 57.2, p < .0001, ηp 2 = .18). The
effects of Characteristics and Exposure remained, and the interaction term
was marginally significant, F(2,268) = 3.1, p = .05, ηp 2 = .02. Analysis of the
interaction supported our hypothesis that Exposure would have a significant
effect on participants’ perception of the offender as adult-like in the Abstract
condition, F(2,268) = 12.0, p = .001, ηp 2 = .12, but not in the Mitigating,
p = .69, or Aggravating, p = .53, conditions.
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Perception as Mediator
As expected, Perception significantly predicted Agreement, F(1,271) = 67.7,
p < .0001, ηp 2 = .20, such that those who viewed the offender as more adultlike were significantly more likely to agree with excluding the offender from
juvenile court. We initially hypothesized that the effects of Characteristics and
Information on Agreement would be explained by their influence on how
adult-like participants perceived the offender in the vignette to be; however,
as reported above, Exposure did not independently affect Agreement, and
the effect of the interaction term on Perception was only marginally significant. Mediation of Characteristics by Perception was estimated by adding
Perception as a covariate to the model that tested the effects of Characteristics
and Exposure on Agreement, controlling for Attitudes. Perception was significant, F(2, 266) 53.1, p < .0001, ηp 2 = .17, and appears to have fully
explained the effects of Characteristics on Agreement. According to the
method described by Sobel (1982), the effect of mediation was significant,
z = 2.15; p = .03. The Characteristics × Exposure interaction effect, although
reduced, remained significant, F(2,266) = 5.5, p = .005, ηp 2 = .04.

DISCUSSION
Results of this study are in line with a growing body of literature suggesting that explicit agreement with the automatic adult adjudication of juvenile
offenders who commit some crimes may obscure the complexity of public
opinion. First, we have shown that characteristics of an offender other than
age and crime type appear to play a role in whether and when a participant
would agree with exclusion for an offender. This was true regardless of participants’ attitudes toward adult sanction for juvenile offenders, which was
measured prior to any experimental manipulations.
The results of our study also shed light on a reason why some surveys suggest that support for automatic exclusion remains relatively high.
Specifically, when no information at all about an offender was provided,
participants were as likely to agree with automatic exclusion from juvenile
court as were participants who read a vignette that included additional aggravating information about an offender; in contrast, participants who read a
vignette that included mitigating information were less likely to agree with
exclusion. That the responses of participants in the Abstract and Aggravating
cases were not different from each other, but were both different from
the Mitigating case, suggests that the participants’ mental models of juvenile offenders (i.e., the example of a juvenile offender that is brought to
mind when no other information is available) might have been closer to the
offender we describe in the Aggravating vignette than the one we describe
in the Mitigating vignette. This result is consistent with other reports that
have suggested that the somewhat homogenous and high level of support
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for “tough on crime” legislation measured via opinion surveys that invoke
general, nonspecific offenders becomes far more heterogeneous when those
polled are provided with specific information about offenders. Stalans and
Diamond (1990) suggest that, in the absence of specific information, participants rely on the most accessible model that they can bring to mind
(the prototypical offender); as mentioned earlier, this “prototypical” juvenile
offender may very well be atypical of the average offender, as the crimes
reported in the news tend to be extreme crimes of remorseless child criminals. This may be why the Aggravating and Abstract cases yielded the same
results.
However, this interpretation is in apparent conflict with Haegerich et al.
(2013), who assessed spontaneous juvenile offender prototypes in their participants prior to enrolling them in a mock trial study with an adolescent
defendant, and found a higher rate of “wayward youth” prototypes relative to “super-predator” prototypes in their sample. Given their results, we
might have expected the Abstract vignette to have been more similar to
the Mitigating vignette. But Haegerich et al. (2013) elicited prototypes prior
to crime exposure. We did not attempt to elicit existing prototypes in our
study, and given that our offense was violent, it may have been more likely
to activate a serious-offender prototype in the Abstract condition. Of course,
discrepancies may also be a result of population differences and history;
we sampled community adults in New York City between 2007 and 2008,
whereas Haegerich et al. (2013) sampled undergraduates at the University
of Illinois at Chicago, and their data appears to have been collected before
2003.
We also found support for our second hypothesis: Previous exposure to
scientific and legal information about juvenile offenders reduced agreement
with adult sanction, and as expected, this effect was limited to the Abstract
condition. When the participants received no other information about the
offender (i.e., Abstract condition), exposure to the information had a fairly
robust effect in reducing support for automatic exclusion. Among participants who received the Abstract vignette and who were not exposed to
information about juvenile offenders, agreement with exclusion was on par
with participants who received the Aggravating case. This effect was fairly
strong (d = .65). Without any other specific details to go on, these participants may have relied on the recent information they received about juvenile
offenders. It appears that this shifted them to a more lenient position relative
to those who were not exposed to this information. We further hypothesized
that both the effects of exposure and offender characteristics would operate
via the perception of the offender as more or less adult-like. This was true
for offender characteristics, which was completely mediated by perception of
the offender as adult-like. When available for review by participants, factors
other than crime type and age contributed to how adult-like an offender was
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perceived to be, which in turn contributed robustly to the likelihood that participants would agree with statutory exclusion for the offender. In addition,
regardless of the vignette, exposure to information rendered participants less
likely to see the offender in the vignette as adult-like. However, exposure
to information only had an effect on agreement with automatic exclusion
in the Abstract condition, and perception of offender as adult-like does not
appear to explain the interaction effect of Exposure and Characteristics on
Agreement with exclusion.
This pattern of results suggests that information exposure operated
through some other mechanism, besides perception of maturity, in weakening agreement for statutory exclusion (or that we measured perception of
maturity imprecisely). This raises a question as to whether or not we affected
something other than perception of the juvenile’s maturity or sophistication
with our information exposure manipulation. To enhance the realism of the
expert testimony used to expose unwitting participants to information about
juvenile offenders, the testimony included information relevant to various
aspects of adolescent development and juvenile law, not just maturity. For
example, the witness cited evidence to suggest that adolescents processed as
adults are more likely to recidivate than those processed as juveniles (Fagan,
1996). Perhaps it was this, or other pieces of information, that weakened
support for exclusion, more so than the information on adolescent development and legal capacities. Indeed, another reason to doubt that apparent
support for exclusion statutes reflects the real sentiment of the voters is
that many people may actually misunderstand how statutory exclusion laws
work. For example, Moon, Sundt, Cullen, and Wright (2000) reported preferences for adult sanction along with attitudes favoring the rehabilitation
of juvenile offenders. The authors suggested that those who express support for statutory exclusion may well be unaware that adult sanction of
a juvenile very often means that the offender will not have access to the
rehabilitative services offered to offenders who remain in the juvenile system. Similarly, Piquero and Steinberg (2009) reported data from four states
(Illinois, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Washington) that suggest the public is willing to pay more for rehabilitation than incarceration; this, despite their study
the following year, which suggested that respondents expressed support for
adult sanction of juveniles for at least some crimes (Steinberg & Piquero,
2010). If this is the case, then the effect that exposure to scientific data had
on participants’ support for automatic exclusion might have had more to do
with a correction of misinformation about adult adjudication rather than misperceptions about the maturity of juvenile offenders. While it is not possible
for us to make a definitive statement as to the mechanism by which information exposure affected agreement with exclusion, it is clear that, in the
Abstract case, unexposed participants viewed the offender in the vignette
as more deserving of adult sanction than exposed participants. This is congruent with previous research: people tend to be less lenient when given
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nonspecific, abstract information about offenders and offenses than when
they have other information to help them make dispositional decisions. Our
study adds to this by showing that this information can be in the form of
general educational material or case-specific details. This result has clear
implications for policy advocates, but it may also have significance for practitioners acting as expert witnesses and their retaining attorneys. Of course,
in a trial, case-specific information is ample, but this line of research could
(and should) be extended to examine whether jury education on the part of
experts can help combat preexisting biases or false beliefs as jurors evaluate
the evidence presented in the context of legal proceedings.
Finally, it is important to note that a priori Attitudes was a significant
predictor of agreement with exclusion and the effect of attitudes on agreement with exclusion was fully explained by perception of the offender in the
vignette as adult-like. This suggests that, to a large degree, participants were
predisposed to think of an offender one way or other (i.e., more or less adultlike) and that this predisposition (whether based on one’s own experience or
media reports) explained slightly more of the variance in the outcome than
did Characteristics of the offender and exposure to information. Nonetheless,
this does not diminish the fact that, when available, additional information
about offenders strengthened or weakened positions toward exclusion.

Limitations and Future Directions
This is one of only a handful of experimental studies (Najdowski et al.,
2009; Nunez et al., 2007; Scott et al., 2006; Stalans & Henry, 1994) that
have examined support for statutory exclusion for offenders as a function
of offender characteristics other than age and crime type. Our results are
consistent with these existing studies and suggest a nuanced and complex
view of the adolescent offender; one that may be obscured by opinion polls
that are relatively nonspecific. Nonetheless, interpretation of our results is
constrained by several limitations. Among obvious weaknesses, we used a
self-selected sample that was not representative of the general population.
It was majority female, most participants were from the greater New York
metropolitan area, and the majority described themselves as moderate to
liberal in their political views.3 While our results are in line with those of
other research teams who used more diverse samples, it is still important
to acknowledge that the impact of the information exposure manipulation
may well vary accordingly to demographic attributes of the samples studied.
While we think that these data still make an important contribution to the
3
Of note, we obtained nearly identical results in the two pilot studies we conducted with undergraduate students (Zottoli & Zapf, 2006; Zottoli, Daftary, Rodriguez, & Zapf, 2009). Our student samples
were largely minority (Black and Hispanic) and of mixed gender, and expressed greater initial support
for exclusion, on average, than our community sample).
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body of knowledge, they are only generalizable to a small segment of the
electorate. The scope of political and cultural differences within and among
cities, states, and larger geographical regions necessitates the replication of
studies like this one across a wide range of samples. We also did not include
a similar expert testimony-evaluation task for the unexposed participants.
It is possible that mere exposure to any psychological data with relevance
for the law could have influenced participants’ responses to the vignettes.
While we think that our pattern of results renders this interpretation unlikely,
it cannot be entirely ruled out. In addition, we (purposefully) did not manipulate age in our design, but it may be that as offenders get younger or older
the strength of the influence of factors other than crime type will change.
Beyond methodological weaknesses, it is also important to consider competing explanations for the results obtained. Although our results suggest
greater support for traditional waiver than for statutory exclusion, we cannot entirely discount the possibility that the effect of offender characteristics
was a result of participants viewing the offender in the Mitigating case as
an exception to the rule. That is, in an ideal world, perhaps, participants
would like these factors to be considered, but their actual political position
may remain unchanged. They may still believe that most offenders who meet
general exclusion rules are more like the youth in the Aggravating vignette
than the youth in the Mitigating vignette (however incorrect such an assumption might be; e.g., Bishop & Frazier, 2000b) and that there is no reason to
make these laws more flexible. In this study. we did not ask people if they
wanted to see the law changed; we just asked whether they agreed with the
law as applied to the specific offender in the vignette. Furthermore, attitudes
toward juvenile transfer were not measured again at the completion of the
study to determine whether they remained unchanged. Future studies should
attempt to clarify this issue.
And of course, these data, and data from any study such as this, are only
a snapshot in time. Our data were collected after the Roper v. Simmons, 2005,
U.S. Supreme Court decision that rendered the death penalty unconstitutional
for those who committed crimes as juveniles, but before Graham v. Florida,
2010, and Miller v. Alabama, 2012, which did the same for mandatory
life sentences without possibility for parole; the shifting of media attention
toward these issues is likely both a cause and a reflection of changing public
sentiment.
Finally, while this study suggests that explicit attitudes in the absence
of case-specific details do not map perfectly onto more informed decision
making, it is explicit attitudes that the electorate makes heard at the ballot box. Thus, the extent to which a layperson’s opinion reflects reality is
important. The scientific community is aware that adult sanction has adverse
consequences on recidivism rates of adolescent offenders (Bishop, Frazier,
Lanza-Kaduce, & Winner, 1996; Winner, Lanza-Kaduce, Bishop, & Frazier,
1997), and that most adolescent offenders do not commit violent crimes: only
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3.9% of juvenile arrests were for violent crimes in 2012 (Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2014). The weight of psychological and
neuroscientific research to date suggests that a separate system of justice,
rather than criminal court, is appropriate for most adolescent offenders (e.g.,
Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000; Gardner & Steinberg, 2005; Grisso et al., 2003;
Luna, Garver, Urban, Lazar, & Sweeney, 2004; Monk et al., 2003; Steinberg
& Cauffman, 1996; van Duijvenvoorde, Jansen, Visser, & Huizenga, 2010).
If the goal of psycholegal research is to shape a scientifically informed public policy, efforts designed to address common misconceptions among the
lay public might be necessary. Attitude change is by no means an easy road
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Petty & Cacioppo, 1996); however, this study provides
a small glimpse into the possibility that behavioral change can follow direct
exposure to scientific information. Whether this can serve to permanently
alter explicit attitudes is unknown.
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